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2411.proThe authors argue that group threat is a key driver of the adoption
of new and controversial policies. Conceptualizing threat in spatial
terms, they argue that threat is activated through the joint occurrence
of ð1Þ proximity to threatening groups and ð2Þ the population density
of threatened groups. By analyzing the adoption of county and state
“dry laws” banning alcohol from 1890 to 1919, they first show that pro-
hibition victories were driven by the relative strength of supportive con-
stituencies such as native whites and rural residents, vis-à-vis oppo-
nents such as Irish, Italian, or German immigrants or Catholics. Second,
they show that threat contributed to prohibition victories: counties bor-
dering large immigrant or urban populations, which did not them-
selves contain similar populations, were more likely to adopt dry laws.
Because threat arises between interactions at the local ðcountyÞ level,
policy change at the higher ðstateÞ level is not reducible to the variables
driving local policy.INTRODUCTION
How does group threat shape the adoption of new and controversial pol-
icies? Drawing on theories of collective action and racial/ethnic threat, we
bring new empirical analyses to bear on this question. Using data that areAJS Volume 121 Number 2 (September 2015): 1–36 1
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American Journal of Sociologyunique in their extensive coverage of the spatial environment, multiple polit-
ical scales, and long historical period, we make three claims about policy
change. First, we show that policy change is driven by the strength of un-
derlying demographic groups that oppose or favor the policy. Second, we ar-
gue that threat is a major component of policy change. Specifically, we con-
tend that demographic changes that challenge the economic, political, and
cultural standing of established groups encourage widespread mobilization
and support for new policies tomaintain or restore group status. Third, threat
arises primarily from interactions between spatially proximate units at the
local level ðin our case countiesÞ, and therefore higher-level policy change
ðat the state levelÞ is not reducible to the variables driving local policy. This
work thus lays the ground for an understanding of policy change that re-
sults not only from the properties of individual political units but also through
interaction with neighboring units.
We examine these claims through an analysis of the legislative victories
ð“dry” lawsÞ of the U.S. prohibition movement. The prohibition movement
emerged out of, and alongside, other progressive movements such as the abo-
lition and women’s suffrage movements ðTimberlake 1963; Paulson 1973;
McCammon and Campbell 2002Þ. Prohibition became increasingly distinct
as it moved from a persuasion-based movement, based on mutual support
groups and teetotal pledges, to an increasingly sophisticated political move-
ment with specific policy goals ðRosenthal et al. 1985Þ. Like many other so-
cial movements, prohibition had a complex history with multiple leaders,
constituencies, organizations, and strategic approaches. For example, prohi-
bitionists used moral suasion, the establishment of local reform associations,
disruptive and confrontational protest, “single issue” endorsements of candi-
dates, and third party politics. Although early waves of temperance mobili-
zation emerged by the 1820s, we focus on 1890–1919 when the movement in-
tensified its legislative efforts and saw most of its political successes. Often
characterized as a failed experiment now, when national prohibitionwas passed
in 1919 it was seen by many as the beginning of a new era of unprecedented
morality and economic prosperity. Even after its repeal in 1933, prohibition’s
impact on social and cultural practices was enduring; per capita alcohol con-
sumption did not reach preprohibition levels until the 1970s ðKyvig 1979;
Rochon 2000; Blocker 2006Þ. While the prohibition movement is an impor-
tant case in its own right, the long historical period, large geographic scope,
and multiple political scales in which the movement operated make it ideal
for advancing our understanding of policy change. Here, we examine the fun-dation ðSES-1247319Þ. We are grateful to Shawn Bauldry, Michael Biggs, Brayden King,
Michael Lewis, Adam Slez, and Paul Voss for feedback and helpful advice. A previous
version was presented at the 2010 American Sociological Association meetings. Direct
correspondence toKennethT.Andrews,Department of Sociology, CB3210,University of
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Group Threat and Policy Changedamental demographic constituencies and conflicts underlying the movement
and its opponents.THREAT IN MOBILIZATION AND POLICY CHANGE
Threat is a central driver of collective action and policy change. We under-
stand threat broadly to encompass economic, political, and cultural threats
to established groups. Race and ethnicity scholars have long held that threat
is central to the formation and maintenance of group boundaries and indi-
vidual attitudes and identities. Although threat has been downplayed inmuch
of the dominant theorizing of collective action and political sociology, scholars
have rediscovered threat in recent years to explain patterns of mobilization.
We draw insights from these two major strands of theory and scholarship
ðrace and ethnicityÞ to examine how threat drives policy change. Then, we
show how a spatial conception of threat, combined with a novel analytic
strategy employing spatial analysis, can improve our understanding of threat
and policy change.Threat in Studies of Race and Ethnicity
Race and ethnicity scholars have documented the ways that threat operates
in the construction of group boundaries, the formation of collective identity
and group solidarity, and mobilization to defend or advance group interests.
Foundational insights can be traced to Blalock’s ð1967Þ focus on the rela-
tive size of ethnic and racial groups and Barth’s ð1969Þ attention to “the
ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses”
ðp. 15Þ. This focus on group size, composition, and boundaries challenged
expectations that prejudice and ethnic conflict would decline with increasing
intergroup contact and has found broad support across numerous settings
ðQuillian 1996; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; King andWeiner
2007Þ.
Key debates have focused on the extent to which threat is primarily eco-
nomic, political, or cultural and whether threats are symbolic or linked to real
individual or group interests ðOlzak 1992; Bail 2008; Wimmer 2008; Fox and
Guglielmo 2012Þ. Although the dominant conception of ethnic competition
theory focuses on economic resources, the core insight can be extended be-
yond labor market settings ðCarroll and Hannan 1989; Pinard and Belanger
1991Þ. For example, Koopmans and Olzak ð2004Þ find that the immigrant
groups in Germany that are least likely to compete with native Germans
for jobs are targeted in right wing violence ðsee also Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Schneider 2008; Hopkins 2010Þ. Thus, perceptions of threat
respond not only to the size of threatening populations but also to culturally




American Journal of SociologyThreat in Studies of Collective Action
Dominant theories of collective action have paid little attention to threat,
focusing instead on preexisting organization and political institutions. In
distancing themselves from earlier collective behavior theorists ðTurner and
Killian 1987Þ, others conceptualized threats as either insufficient to explain
mobilization ðMcCarthy and Zald 1977Þ or a constant ðMcAdam 1982; Tar-
row 1998Þ. This is despite foundational work highlighting both opportuni-
ties and threat ðTilly 1978Þ.2 Nevertheless, scholars have begun to pay con-
siderable attention to threat as a primary factor driving collective action.
Van Dyke and Soule ð2002Þ, for example, identify a macro strand of col-
lective behavior theory focusing on the way strain, grievances, and threats
ðboth real and perceivedÞ can mobilize solidaristic groups through pre-
existing organizations and identities ðsee also Opp 1988Þ. They distinguish
this approach from the microlevel tradition in which actors were charac-
terized as psychologically distressed and socially isolated. Although the micro
tradition has not held up under rigorous analysis ðSnow and Oliver 1995;
Klandermans 2004Þ, the macrolevel approach has fared much better and
finds empirical support in recent work ðUseem 1980; Wood and Hughes 1984;
Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005; McVeigh
2006Þ.
Snow and his colleagues conceptualize threat in terms of quotidian dis-
ruptions—threats to “the taken for granted routines and attitudes of every-
day life” ð1998, p. 1Þ. This perspective identifies central mechanisms by
which threat leads to collective action. For example, as social, economic,
and political resources become, or are perceived as, more scarce, collective
action is more likely. Further, Snow et al. argue that violations to one’s
sense of privacy, safety, and control are crucial. The insight is borrowed
from Goffman’s argument that humans operate with a “culturally elastic
zone of privacy and control regarded as out of bounds to the uninvited,
strangers, and corporate and governmental agents” ðSnow et al. 1998, p. 8Þ.
Changes that are seen to violate this sphere often extend to family, neigh-
borhood, and community, and these can facilitate the growth of collec-
tive action. Conflicts over siting decisions are clear illustrations, such as
the placement of homeless shelters near schools and neighborhoods. More-
over, siting conflicts reveal the fundamentally spatial basis of threat-based
mobilization.
Some of the most important efforts to examine debates about threat and
collective action have focused on white supremacist movements ðAndrews
2002; McVeigh 2006, 2009; Cunningham and Phillips 2007Þ. However,2Scholars have examined threat in the political process tradition, but this has been
limited primarily to protest and repression dynamics ðBrockett 1993; Koopmans 1993;
Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Useem and Goldstone 2002; Almeida 2003; Karapin 2011Þ.
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Group Threat and Policy Changethreat is not limited to racist or right-wing movements. For example, in a
study of protest by homeless advocates in U.S. cities, Snow et al. ð2005Þ
show that protest was more likely in cities with more expensive housing,
higher unemployment, manufacturing decline, and greater poverty ðsee also
Opp 1988; Gordon and Jasper 1996; Johnson and Frickel 2011Þ. The impli-
cation is clear that we should salvage the macrostructural aspects of threat
and incorporate these insights more fully into sociological theories of mobi-
lization and its consequences.q2
q3Space, Scale, and Threat
Although there is a crucial interpretive process ðGerteis 2007Þ, we argue
that spatial-demographic patterns can reveal the social forces that trigger
threat-based mobilization and broader political changes.3 Threat as under-
stood by scholars of race and collective action implies a spatial analysis with
attention to boundaries and territorial conflict. However, scholars have paid
little attention to the social organization of space, which is integral to the
construction of group boundaries,mobilization strategies, and policy change
ðSewell 2001Þ. By incorporating an analysis of space, we argue that threat
is activated through the joint occurrence of ð1Þ proximity ðor exposureÞ to
threatening groups and ð2Þ the population density of threatened groups.
Collective action flows through spatially organized patterns of interac-
tion ðTilly 2000; Sewell 2001Þ. Spatial density ðor isolationÞ may facilitate
mobilization by providing relatively safe areas in which to develop a critical
mass of activists ðZhao 1998Þ, reducing the costs of communication and co-
ordination ðWalker 1969Þ and contributing to the development of space-
based cultures of solidarity ðFantasia 1989Þ. Actors seeking to promote
reforms maneuver to leverage spatially constituted opportunities and com-
pensate for weaknesses elsewhere ðGould 1991; Mintrom 1997; Dochartaigh
and Bosi 2010Þ.
Because threats are often constituted by disruptions to everyday life
ðSnow et al. 1998Þ, spatial proximity ðor exposureÞmay increase threat ðDixon
2006Þ and therefore threat-based mobilization ðBarth 1969; Cunningham
and Phillips 2007Þ. Figure 1 illustrates this key insight by representing dif-
ferent spatial configurations of threatening and threatened groups in rela-
tion to one another. The figure contains four hypothetical spatial arrange-
ments of threatening and threatened groups. Shaded squares represent units
with a greater share of threatening groups. Considering the center square
as the focal unit, we expect the likelihood of successful policy change within3Snow et al. identify two other ways that threat leads to collective action—major ac-
cidents and “dramatic changes in structures of social control.”We suspect that these are
less relevant to sustained mass movements like prohibition than the two factors we
discuss in the text.
2411.proof.3d 5 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
5
FIG. 1.—Spatial threat and antagonistic groups. Four hypothetical spatial arrange-
ments ða–dÞ of threatening and threatened groups. Shaded squares represent units with
a greater share of threatening groups.
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American Journal of Sociologythe focal unit to be greater as we move from one panel to the next. The focal
units in a and b contain threatening groups that should resist restrictive
policy changes. We expect policy change to be more likely in b because the
proximity of threatening groups will encourage stronger mobilization by
native groups in the focal unit. For panels c and d, the focal unit should be
more likely to adopt policy than in a or b because it has a smaller share of
threatening groups. We expect that the focal units in panel d should be more
likely to adopt the policy than in c because c combines a large constituency
surrounded by neighboring units with greater threatening groups.
Contemporary and historical examples provide support for this expec-
tation regarding proximity. In her study of late 19th-century anti-vice cam-1.proof.3d 6 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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Group Threat and Policy Changepaigns, Beisel argues that potent movements emerged where elites faced
“pressure from a large and politically powerful immigrant working class”
ð1990, p. 58Þ. However, threat was articulated culturally as concerns about
the safety of children’s social environment. Beisel points to several strategies
including efforts to close skating rinks that promoted the “promiscuous
mingling of all classes” and sending children away to elite boarding schools
ðp. 58Þ. More recently, Tepper examined protest about art and culture
in U.S. cities between 1995 and 1998, finding that recent increases in the
foreign-born population had the strongest influence on protest activity. Tepper
argues that “protests over art and culture typically originate from local con-
cerns and grievances, target works that are produced and/or disseminated
locally, and play out in local venues” ð2011, p. 260Þ.
We argue that density and proximity interact to shape the likelihood
of threat, mobilization, and policy change. Thus, we expect that political
units with homogenous threatened groups and high levels of exposure to
threatening groups in neighboring units will be the most likely to adopt
policies. This insight has received initial support in studies of racial and ethnic
mobilization. For example, in an analysis of white antibusing protest, Olzak,
Shanahan, andWest ð1994Þ show that cities with higher levels of racial iso-
lation before desegregation began and greater exposure to minority groups
after had more extensive protest ðsee also Biggs and Knauss 2012Þ. At the
same time, because contact is necessary for quotidian disruption, it follows
that threat operates most powerfully at the local level and is less central as
a direct mechanism of change at spatially larger ðe.g., state and nationalÞ
levels.Synthesis
Threat is an important catalyst for the mobilization of groups. Our synthesis
of prior theory and empirical results indicates that threat is often actuated
at the local level, even when it spurs national or state-level politics. Threat
therefore becomes a mechanism driving local mobilization and policy change.
Yet scholarship on the policy implications of threat has been lacking. We
now turn to an empirical analysis of the prohibition movement, which pro-
vides an excellent case in which to examine these dynamics because similar
laws banning alcohol were passed at county, state, and national levels.TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION IN U.S. HISTORY
Prohibition is one of the largest, longest running, complex, and influential
movements in U.S. history.With its emergence in the 1820s, the temperance
movement formed one of the “first national social movements in the United
States” ðYoung 2002, p. 660Þ. Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson’s ð2000Þ study2411.proof.3d 7 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologyof civic associations shows that temperance organizations were among the
first movement organizations to mobilize a large national membership base.
Temperance mobilization unfolded in several distinct “waves.” The move-
ment’s earliest phase began in the northeast, was led by the American Tem-
perance Society, and had strong religious foundations. Temperance advo-
cates relied on a diverse set of strategies and targets including tracts to affect
moral suasion, but the central organizing device became the “teetotal” pledge
through which individuals abstained from drinking wine, beer, and liquor.
The second upsurge of temperance mobilization peaked in the 1850s, enjoyed
much greater mass support, and was led by organizations that emphasized
mutual benefit and solidarity. The early movement also directed most of
its energy toward churches and the conversion of individuals rather than
directing action toward state-orientated goals ðYoung 2002Þ.
The Civil War stalled temperance reform, which did not begin to re-
cover until the 1870s. During the 1870s and 1880s the largest and most im-
portant temperance organization was the Good Templars, similar to the
fraternal orders of the time ðFahey 1996Þ. In the 1870s, women took a more
central role in the leadership and direction of the movement. This turn was
set in motion during the Women’s Crusades of 1873 and 1874, when women
in 911 communities in 31 states used marches and direct action to close
down saloons ðBlocker 1989, p. 77; Pegram 1998, p. 58Þ. Founded in 1874,
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union ðWCTUÞ became the driving
force in the movement until the 1890s ðBlocker 1989Þ. TheWCTU pursued
many issues alongside prohibition, including women’s suffrage, but this ex-
pansive agenda diluted its temperance message. McCammon and Campbell
ð2002Þ, for instance, note that the WCTU often partnered with the women’s
suffrage organizations but almost always to work on suffrage, rather than
prohibition. Throughout this period temperance advocates were constrained
by the efforts of the national political parties to contain prohibition as a
local issue and prevent its divisiveness from undercutting party loyalty. The
WCTU attempted to work around this problem by forging alliances with
the Prohibition Party, but this strategy dissolved in the mid-1890s and was
never very effective ðBlocker 1989Þ.
While there were minor political victories in the early temperance move-
ment, the bulk of the movement’s policy successes occurred between 1890
and 1919—culminating with the establishment of national prohibition. These
years saw a great increase in the number of states and counties adopting
prohibition legislation. This success is often credited to the sophisticated po-
litical tactics of the Anti-saloon League ðASLÞ. Founded in 1893, the ASL
was organized as a professional interest group relying on paid staff with
minimal representative democracy. Abandoning the expansive and more
radical agenda of the WCTU and the third-party strategy of the Prohibi-




Group Threat and Policy Changeoritized the concerns that motivated the relatively cautious middle-class
constituency for temperance ðKerr 1985; Szymanski 2003bÞ. The ASL de-
veloped their organizational model and strategy in Ohio during the 1890s,
countering the more diffuse and radical strategies of the WCTU and Pro-
hibition Party ðKerr 1985Þ. By engaging supporters with moderate tactics
and goals, the ASL laid the foundation for the more radical goals of state
and national prohibition.
The national strategy of the ASL was to focus first on the county level,
then on the state level, and finally on the national level. The idea was that
as the majority of a state’s counties went dry, the state would then follow
suit, until a quorum of states was reached, at which point the entire country
would go dry. As one leaflet from the Michigan ASL put it, “No state has
recently adopted state-wide prohibition until half its territory was ‘dry’ by
‘local option.’ . . . When enough counties in Michigan go ‘dry’ Michigan
will have state-wide prohibition. . . . When nineteen more states go ‘dry’ we
will have national prohibition. . . . Your votes, your money, your influence,
count for a ‘dry’ county, a ‘dry’ state, a dry nation” ðBoyer 1916, pp. 588–89Þ.
This strategy of “local gradualism” was distinct from earlier efforts to di-
rectly reform state-level laws and had its roots in the more organic Southern
experiments with local laws ðSzymanski 2003bÞ. Through its publications,
the ASL projected its territorial accomplishments by displaying the large
numbers of dry counties and the spatially concentrated basis of the liquor
industry ðBoyer 1992, p. 205Þ. Beginning in 1913, emboldened by local vic-
tories, the ASL made the move of pursuing a national constitutional amend-
ment ðBlocker 1989Þ.
While organizations were important players in the development of the
movement, the legislative successes of these organizations ultimately rested
on the motivation and efficacy of their constituent populations. We now turn
to a discussion of those groups, their motivations, and the social changes
that gave rise to them.Immigration, Ethnicity, and Race
The most influential explanation of prohibition sees it as a reaction by na-
tive whites to new immigrant groups, particularly Germans but also the
Irish ðGusfield 1963; Timberlake 1963; Lantzer 2009Þ. The late 19th and early
20th centuries witnessed massive waves of immigration from central and
southern Europe. Although the percentage foreign-born did not change
dramatically between 1860 and 1920 ðhovering around 14%Þ, the settle-
ment pattern of new immigrants was highly uneven and closely connected
to many other changes occurring in society, including industrialization and
urbanization ðDaniels 2002, p. 125Þ. Moreover, multiple decades of im-
migrant settlement produced rich communities with “a vibrant ‘alternative2411.proof.3d 9 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologyculture’ of work and leisure in which the saloon and the enjoyment of strong
drink figured prominently as symbols of community and autonomy” ðPegram
1998, p. 88Þ.
In his classic sociological account of the prohibition movement, Gusfield
ð1963Þ argued that the temperance movement was a reaction of native whites
to a Weberian status threat represented by new immigrant groups. Gus-
field notes that temperance supporters were often tied to the Nativist move-
ment, arguing that native white Protestants “sensed the rising power of
these strange, alien peoples and used temperance legislation as one means
of impressing upon the immigrant the central power and dominance of native
American Protestant Morality” ðp. 7Þ.
Conceptions of ethnic threat were fundamentally spatial and linked to
potential sources of group contact. Prohibition advocates pressed for laws
that would constrain saloons, including their proximity to schools and
churches, thereby minimizing “quotidian disruptions.” In many cases, pro-
ponents revealed the link between their support for prohibition and per-
ceptions of immigrant groups. For example, the Chicago Tribune argued
that “enforcement of a Sunday-closing law ½was necessary to prevent ‘the
German conquest’ of the city” ðHigham 1955Þ. Similarly, prohibition sup-
porters in Indiana targeted the “continental Sabbath” as part of immigrant’s
“beer garden civilization” ðLantzer 2009, p. 27Þ. In Iowa, the Des Moines
Register told German opponents of prohibition: “If you do not like this coun-
try and its people, the world is full of other countries to which you can go”
ðGjerde 1999, pp. 292–93Þ. Immigrant groups responded in turn, arguing
that prohibition laws suppressed long-standing cultural traditions. As Pe-
gram found, “many immigrants saw no reason to adopt the stern Puritan
tradition of ‘a dead Sunday, with the silence of a graveyard and bare of
any joys of life’” ð1998, p. 99Þ. Figure 2 shows how this political division
between immigrants and native whites in Michigan manifested itself in a
strong negative spatial correlation between counties that had adopted dry
laws and counties with a high proportion of Irish, Italian, and ðespeciallyÞ
German immigrants.
Although this argument about ethnic threat and status conflict is highly
influential in scholarship on prohibition, the hypothesis remains contested.
Blocker ð1989Þ, for example, notes that some immigrants mobilized in sup-
port of temperance and prohibition ðsee also Rumbarger 1989Þ. Unfortu-
nately, most of the evidence comes from the statements of national prohi-
bition leaders and organizations ðGusfield 1963; Clark 1976; Pegram 1998Þ
rather than the state and county levels where prohibition was primarily fought
over. What is lacking, then, is a systematic comparative analysis across states,
counties, and time periods.
There is a parallel debate on whether prohibition was motivated by racial
threat, especially in the U.S. South. Some scholars have argued that prohi-1.proof.3d 10 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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FIG. 2.—Immigrant populations and prohibition status in Michigan, 1910. Spatial
arrangement of those foreign-born ðGermans primarily, but also Irish and Italian pop-
ulationsÞ and the prohibition status by county. Percent foreign category is mapped accord-
ing to counties that were above or belowMichigan’s mean level of 4.5% in 1910. Notice that
no county above the mean level of foreign-born residents has adopted a dry law.
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Group Threat and Policy Changebition advocates appealed to the racist view of white voters in the South to
generate support for local-option laws, but the historical evidence is mixed
ðSzymanski 2003aÞ. Southern counties did, in fact, adopt prohibition laws
earlier than most other regions. Timberlake argues that the roots of South-
ern prohibition were in fear of race conflict ð1963, p. 120Þ. However, Gusfield
ð1963Þ, among others, argues that this was not primarily rooted in efforts to
control blacks. Blocker argues that while Southern drys used racist argu-
ments, racism was just as central to Southern wet arguments, and he adds
that whites in areas with large black populations were among the least likely
to support prohibition ð1989, p. 107Þ.Religion
Prohibition is often portrayed as a clash between different religious tradi-
tions. That religion should have played a significant role is unsurprising,
given that the 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed major changes in the
religious ecology of American communities ðChristiano 1987; Land, Deane,
and Blau 1991; Finke and Stark 1993; Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996; Kocak
and Carroll 2008Þ. The most striking of these changes is the simultaneous2411.proof.3d 11 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologygrowth in church membership alongside increasing diversity in religious
organizations and identities ðKocak and Carroll 2008Þ. The prohibition move-
ment was one of a cluster of movements motivated by evangelical Protes-
tantism—especially rooted in growingMethodist and Baptist congregations
ðTimberlake 1963Þ. The early temperance movement emerged from Prot-
estant churches, and its structure, development, and strategy was shaped
by its religious foundation ðYoung 2002Þ. Many of its leaders were them-
selves Protestant ministers, and Protestant churches played a key role in the
organization of the movement ðGusfield 1963Þ. Catholics, however, were
largely resistant to prohibition, given the direct challenge to it posed to their
religious practices ðPanunzio 1932; Lewis 2007Þ.
Organizationally, congregations comprised the local support base for
temperance throughout its history, and this was critical for women’s mass
participation and leadership in the movement ðSkocpol 1992; Clemens
1997Þ. The ASL, for example, defined itself as “the Church in Action Against
the Saloon,” developing strong ties to local congregations and especially
to the Methodist Church ðGusfield 1963; Kerr 1985; Blocker 1989, p. 109Þ.
Szymanski ð2003bÞ argues that it was the single-issue, moderate focus of
the ASL that allowed churches to become mobilized. ASL leaders traveled
to churches to make speeches to generate financial and electoral support
ðLantzer 2009Þ. By contrast, religious leaders and organizations were deeply
divided in whether or how to support the WCTU or Prohibition Party ðKerr
1985Þ. But, Boyer ð1992Þ argues that ASL leadership adopted a secular ap-
proach. As it has in many movements, religion played a dual role: shaping
identities and orientations toward drinking and alcohol, while religious
organizations facilitated mobilization and provided strategic and organi-
zational templates ðKniss and Burns 2004Þ.
There are three distinct arguments about the religious basis of prohi-
bition support, although they lead to similar empirical expectations. First,
much like ethnicity, religious traditions constituted collective identities that
shaped understandings of group status and perceived threats to that status.
As such, the rise of competing religious traditions, and especially the growth
of Catholicism during this period, motivated Protestants to support pro-
hibition as a way of resisting cultural changes ðGusfield 1963Þ. Second, con-
gregations constituted the primary site for mobilization and included estab-
lished leadership, communication networks, and preexisting solidarities.
Third, religious traditions were associated with distinct ideological bases
for temperance support and opposition. The focus on self-discipline, indi-
vidualism, and personal transformation was central to temperance dis-
course. In contrast, Catholicism and what have been called ritualistic tra-
ditions were more likely to resist prohibition as a threat to cultural tradition
and religious practices ðLewis 2008Þ. At the aggregate level, religious ecol-
ogies, like ethnicity and immigration, may have played a direct role, with1.proof.3d 12 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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Group Threat and Policy ChangeProtestant or pietistic religious adherents supporting the movement and
Catholic, or ritualistic, adherents opposed. Simultaneously, ritualistic ad-
herents may have been perceived as a threat by pietistic groups and thus
motivated prohibition legislation indirectly.Urbanization
Scholars have linked the development of prohibition to underlying social
and economic changes—most importantly to increasing urbanization. Ap-
proximately one-quarter of the U.S. population lived in places of 2,500
or greater in 1870, and by 1920 urban residents had risen to over half the
population. The change was especially dramatic in the major cities; be-
tween 1900 and 1920 New York gained 2.2 million in population ðBoyer
1992Þ.
Urbanization may have aided the development of the temperance move-
ment, as it has for many others, by concentrating organizational resources
and facilitating group coordination. However, most historical accounts
highlight the adoption of prohibition in small towns and rural areas and
resistance to it in urban areas. Some prohibition measures were passed at the
state or county level that contained an exemption for the cities in those areas
ðCherrington 1920Þ. Urbanization may have played a more pivotal role as
a source of threat. Boyer ð1992Þ and Monroe ð2004Þ argue that prohibition
and antiprostitution, as the two significant moral reform movements of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, were motivated by efforts to control the
perceived vices of the city. Boyer notes that the ASL “directed its propa-
ganda less against alcohol per se than against that quintessentially urban
institution: the saloon” ð1992, p. 205Þ. Just as ethnic and cultural ðreligiousÞ
threat was spatial, prohibition’s advocates were motivated by perceived
threats in nearby cities. For example, in 1905 the South Bend Tribune wor-
ried that “drinkers and ‘lewd women’ were migrating to South Bend” be-
cause of stricter alcohol enforcement in nearby Elkhart, Indiana ðLantzer
2005, p. 57Þ.
The expected impact of urbanization is unclear. One reason is because
urbanization was bound up with other demographic characteristics—im-
migration in particular was concentrated in cities. In fact, the ASL high-
lighted the connections between immigration, urbanization, and saloons in
its communication to supporters. Gusfield argues that temperance was one
way that rural elements sought to deal with the loss of prestige they ex-
perienced as a result of greater urbanization and notes that “major urban
and industrial areas like Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania were the last
to ratify the 18th Amendment” ð1963, p. 103Þ. Blocker ð1989Þ, however,
found no support for the hypothesis of an urban-rural dynamic motivat-
ing temperance legislation. Accordingly, we examine whether urbaniza-2411.proof.3d 13 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologytion shaped patterns of prohibition adoption in our analyses below. The
arguments around urbanization would lead us to expect that, similar to im-
migration and religion, urbanization played a dual role. First urban dwellers
may have directly resisted prohibition efforts, while they may have moti-
vated prohibition legislation through threat in nearby rural areas.Diffusion
Prohibition legislation may have also followed a diffusion process. Schol-
ars have long studied the diffusion of policies ðWalker 1969; Knoke 1982Þ
and movement tactics ðTarrow 1998; Soule 2004Þ. Legislative success may
have diffused spatially, particularly across counties. As neighboring coun-
ties went dry, it may have increased activists’ confidence that success was
possible under local conditions, leading supporters to imitate their neigh-
bors by pushing for prohibition. Prohibition could also have diffused as the
grievances associated with alcohol increasingly spilled over to remaining
wet counties. Leaders in dry counties may have pressured their neigh-
bors to go dry because it was more difficult to enforce prohibition when
neighboring counties were wet. Of course, it is also possible that having a
dry neighbor was good for the local liquor business, and thus neighboring
dry counties would have an inhibiting effect on further prohibition legis-
lation.Summary
Historical scholarship on prohibition provides a strong basis for expecting
that threat was a central dynamic in the adoption of new laws. However,
there is considerable debate regarding the sources of threat. Ethnicity, race,
religion, and urbanization all find some support in the historical records.
Complicating matters further, the history of the movement shows that both
state- and local-level contention were central to the success of the move-
ment. With rare exceptions ðSzymanski 2003b; Lewis 2008Þ, these ideas
have not been tested systematically or in relation to theories of political
change. Thus, our analyses help to resolve significant theoretical and histor-
ical debates.ANALYTIC PLAN: MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
Measuring Prohibition
We measure the adoption of new laws that made the consumption, pro-
duction, and sale of alcohol illegal at the state and county level using a data
set collected by Robert Sechrist ð1999Þ. Drawing on published histories,1.proof.3d 14 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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Group Threat and Policy Changereports, and archival materials, the data document the presence or absence
of state or county prohibition laws for each year from 1800 through the
passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919. The state-level data have
been used as an independent variable in organizational studies of the brew-
ing industry ðCarroll and Swaminathan 1991; Swaminathan 1996; Wade,
Swaminathan, and Saxon 1998; Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert 2009Þ, but scholars
have not made use of the rich county-level data or used the data to trace the
adoption of prohibition laws.We took several steps to check the county-level
data against other available sources, and these efforts provide additional
confidence. First, we compared the Sechrist data for all counties to the pro-
hibition data published in the ASL yearbooks for 1910, 1912, 1914, 1915,
1916, 1917, and 1918 ðCherrington 1908–33Þ. We found that 3.6% of county-
years differed in their prohibition status between the Sechrist and the ASL
reports. To track these errors in more detail, we then analyzed Michigan,
wherewe hadmore detailed historical data yearly from 1890 to 1916 ðMichigan
Department of State 1917Þ. Here we found that Michigan’s county-years, sim-
ilar to national data, differed in 3.6% cases between theASL and the Sechrist
data. Most important, however, we found that for almost all discrepancies
either the Sechrist data were correct or the discrepancy was due to a rea-
sonable difference in coding decisions ðe.g., coding a county as going dry
when the law took effect or when the vote took placeÞ. Overall we found
discrepancies in 7 out of 687 county-years, for a roughly 1% discrepancy
rate. Of these remaining 1% of discrepancies, it was unclear to us whether
the Sechrist data or the historical records were in error. It is clear, however,
that the Sechrist data are superior to the ASL data within Michigan, and
thus the 3.6% discrepancy rate we found in the national data likely signif-
icantly overestimates the errors in the Sechrist data. We checked the state-
level data against historical and primary sources and made a few minor
changes to Sechrist’s coding ðBlocker 1976; Friedrich and Bull 1976Þ.
We analyze the passage of prohibition at two different levels: county and
state. At the county level our outcome is an indicator of whether a county
was wet or had a local prohibition law. County laws were enacted after
local elections; typically citizens would have to collect a set number of pe-
tition signatures to place prohibition on the ballot ðWooddy and Stouffer
1930Þ.4 Counties constrained by a state prohibition law were considered
right censored in our models. At the state level, our outcome is the presence
or absence of a state prohibition law. Certainly, case studies reveal more
complexity and nuance than is captured by our measure. For example, en-
forcement mechanisms attached to the law varied across localities, and a4Two states, Massachusetts and Arkansas, required localities to hold elections on an
annual basis.
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American Journal of Sociologysmall number of wet counties had dry municipalities within them. How-
ever, the key advantage of our measure is that it allows for systematic com-
parison across a large number of states and counties over a long time period.
Thus, we avoid the risk of selecting on dramatic, well-documented, or un-
usual cases. Moreover, the establishment of prohibition laws was a central
and politically important goal of the movement.
During 1890–1919, 1,717 counties adopted dry legislation at least once,
while 28 states were already or became dry. The maps in figures 3, 4, and 5
show the legal status of prohibition in 1890, 1900, and 1910, respectively.
The overall proportion of counties covered by prohibition laws grows
dramatically after 1903. Although the earliest temperance mobilization oc-
curred in New England, the region lags behind all others in the establish-
ment of legal restriction on alcohol. The maps reveal growing political vic-
tories in the Midwest through the 1890s and the strong support for
prohibition in the South that is established in the first decade of the 20th
century. The establishment of county prohibition experiences the longest
period of sustained growth between 1896 and 1911. After 1911, the pro-
portion of counties covered by local laws is supplanted with gains in the
establishment of state prohibition laws.Analytic Strategy and Model Selection
Modeling the onset of prohibition at the state and county level presents a
number of methodological challenges. First, data are hierarchical—coun-FIG. 3.—U.S. prohibition status, 1890
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Group Threat and Policy Changeties are nested within states. Nesting is important because counties could
not vote on local dry legislation until their state had enacted “local-option”
legislation. Furthermore, in states with local-option counties that could
vote dry on their own, some counties became dry because the state wentFIG. 5.—U.S. prohibition status, 1910




American Journal of Sociologydry. While the dry outcome was the same, the determinants of these pro-
cesses were at different levels. Second, data are also arrayed spatially, as
figures 2–5 demonstrate. The “first law of geography” states that places
that are close to one another are similar to one another, often in unmea-
sured ways, giving rise to spatially correlated errors ðTobler 1970Þ. In ad-
dition, spatial diffusion processes may directly influence values of the de-
pendent variable. These two considerations imply that standard errors in
conventional regression models will be biased ðAnselin 2007Þ. Temporal
aspects of dry legislation adoption are also important. The enactment of
dry legislation is an event that generally only happens once—subsequent
dry periods are of less interest than the initial policy transition since they
generally follow automatically.5
Event history diffusion models are well suited to modeling processes
such as these ðStrang and Tuma 1993Þ. Event history diffusion models are
variants of survival models that also include weighted neighboring values
of the dependent variable as a regressor ðAllison 1984Þ. Since we are in-
terested in factors that may increase the risk of a state or county going dry,
we are interested in the hazard rate, hiðtÞ, for county or state i at time t—
the probability that the county or state will go dry in the next year, con-
ditional on not being dry already. We estimate the hazard via a discrete
time logit model, and we estimate separate models for states and counties.6
The state and county models can both be written as follows:
log
hi tð Þ
12 hi tð Þ
 
5 atTi 1 bXit 1 vZt 1 dDit;
where i indexes counties or states respectively, t indexes time, X is a matrix
of time-varying covariates, D is a matrix of weighted neighboring unit
covariates, T is a vector of dummies for the number of years the unit is at
risk,Z is a vector of time-invariant covariates, and a, b, v, and d are vectors5Occasionally states and counties did revert to being wet after experimenting with dry
laws; however, dry laws did tend to be self-reinforcing in that they removed bases of wet
support and increased the morale of dry movement activists ðSzymanski 2003a; Lewis
2008Þ, making the onset of a dry law of primary importance. Specifically, 610 counties
repealed their dry legislation. Of these, 352 reenacted dry legislation, 92 of these counties
then repealed their dry legislation a second time, and 64 of those enacted dry legislation
for a third time. We took two measures to ensure that the choice to model the first
prohibition adoption was not driving our results. First, we include a dummy variable in
our analyses for counties that eventually repealed prohibition. Second, we tried mod-
eling the final, never repealed, prohibition transition with similar results.
6The county-level model is complicated by the fact that counties exit the risk set through
two distinct pathways, when their state adopts prohibition or when national prohibition
is enacted. State and county prohibition might be considered to be competing risks. As a
robustness check, we also experimented with a competing risks model ðFine and Gray
1999Þ. Results are similar.
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Group Threat and Policy Changeof parameters to be estimated. Matrix X and vector Z contain within-unit
covariates such as the percentage German-born immigrants in the county
or state, while D contains weighted values for covariates in neighboring
units: calculated as the average value of all counties/states bordering the
county/state ðin our case also weighted by within-unit values, which we
explain belowÞ. We estimate both of these models via maximum likelihood
in Stata 11. Because counties are clustered within states, we employ robust
standard errors in the county model.
Observations begin contributing to the likelihood when units enter the
risk set. We consider states to have entered the risk set in 1890 when our
observation period begins. Because many important religious covariates
are not available before 1890, we focus on 1890–1919. While this choice of
period is admittedly due to constraints on available data, post–Civil War
prohibition victories before 1890 were few and sporadic. Counties enter the
risk set when their state adopts a local-option law making it possible for
counties to vote dry. Dates when states adopted a local option were found
in Cherrington ð1920Þ. When we could not find local-option laws in his-
torical records, we estimated the adoption of the local option as the year the
first county in the state adopts local prohibition, since it is unlikely that
states would adopt the local option without at least one county agitating
for the law—indeed in some states the majority of counties went dry the year
the local option was instated. Before turning to our analyses, we describe the
logic of our measurement of threat and our independent variables.Logic of Threat Analyses
Measurement of the impact of threat on legislation or collective action
entails a particular difficulty. When groups both directly oppose legislation
as well as motivate that same legislation through threat, effects cut both
ways. Blalock ð1967Þ argued that the effect of minority threat would be
curvilinear, and thus one could test for it using a squared term in a re-
gression model. Yet, we generally lack strong theory to specify, a priori, the
shape of such a curve. Another strategy to measure threat would be to
focus on dramatic changes in minority populations. Here again, there are
problems in disentangling threat from other dynamics. Groups may mi-
grate to areas perceived to be less hostile, but the influx may itself lead to
greater hostility from native populations, as when blacks left hostile areas
in the south to move north, these population shifts led to heightened con-
flict in the northern cities ðOlzak 1992; Muller 2012Þ. In addition, we lack
a detailed measure of rapid changes in population because census data are
at 10-year intervals.
Sidestepping the measurement problems noted above, scholars have
measured threat through the size of threatening populations in neighbor-2411.proof.3d 19 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologying counties ðsee, e.g., Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996; Cunningham and
Phillips 2007Þ. We take a similar approach by measuring the percentage of
threatening populations in neighboring counties ðor statesÞ, weighted by
the percentage of the population within a county ðor stateÞ that would have
been threatened. This measure makes for a better match with our theory
than would a simple spatial lag of the threatening population, since we
would not expect, for instance, a largely German county to be threatened
by German neighbors.7 Thus, to construct our threat variables we measure
the percentage urban in neighboring counties/states multiplied by the per-
centage rural within the county/state, the percentage native born within a
county multiplied by the percentage immigrant populations in neighbor-
ing counties/states, the percentage native born white within a county/state
multiplied by the percentage black in neighboring counties/states, and the
percentage pietistic within a county/state multiplied by the percentage rit-
ualistic in bordering counties/states. We then normalize the threat variables
by dividing by 100 to put them on a scale similar to that of the percentage
measures.
Threat5




Descriptively, the data tell a straightforward story. Table 1 includes the
mean and standard deviation for our independent variables at 10-year
intervals for U.S. counties: 1890, 1900, 1910, and 1920. These data show
that the average proportion of blacks and German and Irish immigrants
declines over our period of interest, while the proportion of Italian immi-
grants increases. Urbanization is on the rise over this period, as is the ex-
tent of ritualistic and pietistic religious adherents.Ethnicity and Race Variables
Theoretical expectations regarding ethnic and racial threat specify four
major groups as possible threats to native whites ðand bases of opposition
to prohibitionÞ: blacks and Irish, Italian, and German immigrants. To cap-
ture the possible effects of these groups, we constructed variables repre-
senting the percentages of the population of these four groups at the state
and county levels. Because the presence of these immigrants at both the
county and the state level was highly correlated and hypothesized to work7We are grateful to an AJS reviewer for pointing this out. Results for models with a
simple spatial lag are similar to those presented here.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive County Statistics ðfor Selected YearsÞ
1890 1900 1910 1920
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Urbanization ð%Þ . . . 11.2 20.2 13.1 21.1 16.7 23 18.5 24
Black ð%Þ . . . . . . . . . 13.4 21.4 13.2 21.3 12.5 20.6 11.5 19.3
German ð% bornÞ . . . 2.7 4 2.1 3 1.7 2.4 1.2 1.5
Irish ð% bornÞ . . . . . . 1.2 1.8 .8 1.2 .5 .8 .3 .6
Italy ð% bornÞ . . . . . . .2 .6 .3 .8 .5 1.3 .5 1.2
Ritualistic ð%Þ . . . . . . 7.9 13.3 9.6 14.5 9.6 13.9 10.4 14.2
Pietistic ð%Þ . . . . . . . 21.6 13.2 23.8 12.8 24.9 13.1 27.7 14.5
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,764 2,813 2,998 3,043
40
Group Threat and Policy Changein the same way, we aggregated these populations into a single variable
describing the percentage of these foreign-born groups of the population.
Note that this measure is different from the census “foreign-born” category
that includes many other groups that we do not include, because they were
not identified as central to prohibition politics in prior historical work.
All data were derived from the U.S. population censuses from 1890, 1900,
1910, and 1920 ðHaines 2005Þ.Religious Composition
To measure religious composition, we follow Lewis ð2008Þ, who distin-
guished among pietistic and ritualistic religious traditions in his study of
voting in statewide prohibition referenda.8 Ritualistic and nonevangelical
traditions include Catholics, Jews, Episcopalians, German Lutherans, and
Missouri Synod Lutherans. Pietistic traditions include most other Protes-
tant denominations, with the largest being Baptists, Methodists, and Pres-
byterians. We use the number of members expressed as a proportion of the
total population.9 As table 1 indicates, membership in both ritualistic and
pietistic religious organizations grows during this period.
Our measures were constructed using the Census of Religious Bodies
collected in 1890, 1906, 1916, and 1926. These censuses were collected as
organizational surveys, rather than individual ones, using informant re-
ports from leaders to measure membership, finances, buildings, and other8We also used simple Catholic and Protestant measures in separate models, and these
yield similar results.
9We also experimented with a measure using the percentage of religious adherents,
rather than as a percentage of the population. Results were similar. Percentage of pop-
ulation is a better measure because we would not want to treat a county with 10%
ritualistic and 20% pietistic as equivalent to a county with 30% ritualistic and 60%
pietistic adherents.
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American Journal of Sociologycharacteristics of local religious organizations. Although these surveys had
once fallen out of favor among historians of religion, Finke and Stark have
conducted extensive research using independent sources to establish the
validity of the data ðFinke and Stark 1986, 1993; Stark 1992Þ.10Urbanization
We constructed variables for the percentage of urban dwellers in a county
from the decennial U.S. population census from 1890 to 1920. The trend,
as can be seen in table 1, is toward greater urbanization: urbanization in
the average county ðmeasured as residents in municipalities of 25,000 or
greaterÞ doubles during this period.Missing Data and Control Variables
Many of our census measures are only available at 10-year increments; fol-
lowing standard practice, those variables were linearly interpolated ðsee, e.g.,
McCammon et al. 2001Þ. Remaining missing data were imputed using the
transform, then impute, method ðVon Hippel 2009Þ. We created 15 impu-
tation data sets using the iterated chained equations command in Stata 11.
As control variables, we include an indicator variable for the Southern states,
which historians argue had different propensities to adopt state-level pro-
hibition. In our state-level models, we include a control for the percentage
of counties that had previously voted dry, as local dry victories were argued
to hasten the passage of state-level prohibition ðSzymanski 2003b; Lewis
2008Þ. In county-level models, we include a dummy variable for counties
that eventually repealed their local dry law.RESULTS
State-Level Models
State-level models take the first adoption of state prohibition as the out-
come of interest, and state-years are the unit of observation. We estimate
and report nested models with demographic, race, ethnicity/immigration,
and religion variables as well as a full model including all effects ðsee table 2Þ.
Results from the state-level models suggest that the three immigrant
groups, Irish, Italian, and German, jointly affected prohibition legislation10Before 1890, the census did not include direct estimates of membership. Finke and
Stark ð1986Þ pioneered an innovative strategy of estimating membership from other
organizational characteristics such as the number of pews. However, this method is
likely to be less reliable at the county level; thus, we restrict our analyses to 1890 and
after.
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American Journal of Sociologyat the county level. The percentage immigrant population within a state
negatively predicts prohibition legislation. These results hold for both the
nested and full models. Urban and ritualistic populations within a state
negatively predicted prohibition legislation in the nested model, although
because of collinearity with immigrant populations we did not include these
variables in the full model. Percentage blackwas not a significant predictor.
Jointly these results suggest that the resistance of immigrant groups was
most crucial in shaping the adoption of state-level prohibition, rather than
the strength of supportive groups.
The percentage of neighboring states adopting prohibition legislation
was not a predictor of prohibition legislation, failing to support the idea
that state prohibition legislation may have diffused regionally from state
to state. The percentage of dry counties within a state did not predict state
prohibition.
None of our threat variables were significant in the state-level model.
This could be for two reasons. The first possibility is that threat was simply
not a factor in state prohibition politics. A second possibility, which we
explore via the county-level models, is that because threat is a function of
contact, measuring threat at the state level is too large a spatial unit. In
other words, the ethnic or religious composition of neighboring states may
not be as salient as the composition of neighboring counties, which are
more spatially proximate and hence entail a greater likelihood of contact
with threatening groups.County-Level Models
In table 3, we examine county prohibition legislation as the outcome of
interest and the county-year as the unit of observation.11 Covariates are
similar to the state-level analysis, except that they are based on county-
level measures. The results from the county-level models support a much
richer story than the state level.12
Constituencies.—As expected, we find that the strength of local con-
stituencies predicts the adoption of county dry legislation. All but one of the
effects of our constituency variables were significant and in the predicted11One problem with using counties as a unit of analysis over this period is that many
change their borders. Some scholars address this by creating county clusters, but this
method is not appropriate to our data since we have a binary outcome. We addressed
this issue by dropping all counties that change size over 25% from the analysis and re-
running the models. Results yield similar results and do not alter our interpretation.
12 In separate analyses, we included additional controls for two important political fac-
tors: women’s suffrage and voting restrictions based on citizenship and literacy. Includ-
ing these state-level political variables does not alter our main findings or interpretation.
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American Journal of Sociologydirection in both nested and full models. The size of the immigrant, black,
ritualistic religious adherent, and urban populations was negatively asso-
ciated with the passage of prohibition, while the percentage of pietistic re-
ligious adherents was positively associated with prohibition legislation in
the full model but not the nested model.
Threat.—In contrast to the state-level results, we found evidence for
threat motivating prohibition adoption at the county level. We tested four
threat hypotheses at the county level. All threat effects were significant and
in the expected direction in the nested models. In the full model, we find
that the effect of bordering immigrant and urban populations, weighting
for the size of the threatened population within a county, are significantly
predictive of prohibition legislation. The threat effect of ritualistic popu-
lations in the nested model is apparently due to those religious adherents
being disproportionately drawn from these other populations. Threat from
black populations was not significant in the full model.
Diffusion.—We found modest support for the hypothesis that prohibi-
tion legislation was the result of a diffusion process. While the percentage
of neighboring dry counties is significant in all models, this could also be
due to unobserved heterogeneity. Counties near one another will be similar
in unmeasured ways, potentially leading to the significance of a spatially
lagged dependent variable in the absence of real spatial effects. Thus, the sig-
nificance of spatial diffusion variables must be interpreted with the under-
standing that models are biased toward finding diffusion effects ðBraun and
Koopmans 2010; Shalizi and Thomas 2011Þ.
Effect magnitudes.—We conclude by discussing the magnitudes of the
county-level effects, to give some sense of their relative importance. The
magnitude of these effects must be interpreted with caution. For example,
the extent of surrounding immigrant populations is not the same as the
extent of threat felt from those populations. Further, the extent of foreign-
born immigrants is not the same as the extent of culturally foreign popu-
lations—although these are likely highly correlated. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to consider the relative magnitudes of these effects.
Uncertainty in the point estimates was sometimes large and sometimes
small. When the bounds of the confidence interval were identical up to
the second decimal point of the odds ratio, we simply report the effect size
rounded to the second decimal place; when confidence intervals were wider,
we report the 95% confidence interval of odds ratios. We interpret the odds
ratios from the full model only, with reference to the independent variables’
effects on the hazard rate. The hazard rate for discrete time event history
models can be interpreted as the rate at which units experience the outcome.
Thus, in our county models the hazard rate at t for a given county would be
the probability that it enacts prohibition legislation in year t.1.proof.3d 26 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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Group Threat and Policy ChangeOur analysis of effect sizes suggests that the adoption of county prohi-
bition was driven more by the direct and indirect effect of the strength of
prohibition opponents than by the strength of its supporters. For instance,
the size of the pietistic population is, by most historical accounts, the best
measure of the pro-prohibition constituency, yet as we detail below, its
positive effect is only a half to a third of the negative effect of the size of
ritualistic populations. Likewise, immigrant populations seem to have large
effects, both within counties as resisters of prohibition and in surrounding
counties via threat.
We first interpret effects for our within-county constituent population
variables. Having a 1% greater urban population within a county was as-
sociated with a 1%–2% lower hazard rate. A 1% greater black population
within a county was associated with a 1% lower hazard rate. A 1% greater
ritualistic religious population within a county was associated with a 2%–
3% lower hazard rate. Conversely a 1% greater pietistic population share
was associated with a 1% higher hazard rate. By far the largest effect was
that of the immigrant population: a 1% greater immigrant population share
within a county was associated with an 18%–23% decrease in the hazard
rate. While this effect size is large, it needs to be understood with reference
to the scale of the variable, which ranges from 0% to 32% in our data, with
a mean of 3.5%. The 90th percentile of the variable is 9%, so a county at the
90th percentile would have a 110%–115% lower hazard rate than a county
at the mean level. Thus, for within-county measures the largest effect comes
from the immigrant population.
The effect sizes of threat variables are less straightforward to interpret.
We put them on a scale we think makes them roughly commensurate with
the constituent populations. Specifically, threat variables were measured
as the mean percentage of a threatening population in neighboring coun-
ties, multiplied by the percentage of threatened population within the county.
Then to make comparison with other variables more meaningful, we divide
the variable by 100. The threat variables thus theoretically vary from 0 to
100, which is the same scale as the constituent variables. Because the threat
variable is an interaction, it is influenced by the size of the native population
in a focal county and the threatening population in contiguous counties.
For instance, in a hypothetical county with a 100% native population, a
1% greater immigrant population in all its bordering counties would cor-
respond to a unit greater value for the immigrant threat variable, while in a
county with 50% native population, a unit greater immigrant threat vari-
able would require a 2% greater bordering immigrant population.
Two of our threat variables were significant in the full model: urban and
immigrant threat. A one-unit-higher value for the urban threat variable
was associated with a 1%–2% higher hazard rate. A one-unit-higher value2411.proof.3d 27 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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American Journal of Sociologyfor the immigrant threat variable was associated with a 15%–22% higher
hazard rate. This large effect must also be interpreted in terms of the scale
of the variable: a county at the 90th percentile of the immigrant threat
variable, a value of 7, would have a roughly 70%–78% greater hazard rate
relative to a county at the mean value of 3. Thus immigrant threat was the
larger of the two threat effects.CONCLUSION
Taking advantage of unique data spanning the entire continental United
States and unfolding over 30 years, we have been able to test key hypoth-
eses surrounding the role of threat in policy change. Theoretically, we in-
troduce a spatial conception of threat that advances several lines of schol-
arship. Race and ethnicity scholars examine collective identities, group
boundaries, and territorial conflict. We extend this insight, showing how
these processes structure patterns of policy change. For scholars of col-
lective action and political sociology, we go beyond the predominant focus
on proximate causes of policy change to show that the spatial organization
of demographic groups drives policy adoption. These innovations set the
stage for additional work at the intersection of group identity, spatial or-
ganization, and policy change.
Prohibition was motivated by the strength of its key constituencies.
German, Irish, and Italian immigrants were important wet constituencies,
as were ritualistic religious adherents and urban dwellers; while pietistic
adherents were important dry constituencies. We found that sociodemo-
graphic threat was critical for the adoption of prohibition policies. Specif-
ically, proximity to German, Irish, and Italian immigrants and urban dwell-
ers encouraged the adoption of dry legislation at the county level.
This finding contributes to research that stresses the catalyzing role of
threat or grievances in mobilization ðVanDyke and Soule 2002; Snow et al.
2005; McVeigh 2009; Johnson and Frickel 2011Þ. Grievances have long
been assumed to be relatively constant and unable to explain differential
mobilization, and scholars have employed analytic strategies that make
it difficult to gauge whether or how grievances matter. The main strate-
gies have considered temporal variation within a case or cross-sectional
variation across geographic units ðJenkins and Perrow 1977; Olzak and
Shanahan 1996Þ. We introduce a strategy for examining grievances and,
specifically, group threat that is theoretically and empirically more com-
pelling. Exploiting spatial variation in proximity to groups perceived to be
threatening, such as immigrants and urban dwellers, we show that griev-
ances are a central component of policy change in this case. Local threats
arising from the spatial organization of immigrant and urban populations1.proof.3d 28 Achorn International 06/10/2015 9:42PM
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Group Threat and Policy Changeencouraged successes in establishing county-level prohibition. While we
agree that to focus solely on threats would be a mistake, scholars have been
too quick to set aside threats arising from the composition and spatial dis-
tribution of cultural groups.
Scholars have often used states or provinces to gain comparative le-
verage when studying federated political systems. In our case, we compare
state and county political units, finding that the dynamics of policy change
differed in fundamental ways. This is crucial because it means that theo-
retical insights derived from analyses at one political scale will not neces-
sarily hold for higher- or lower-level units. For instance, we found that the
demographic composition of neighboring units was important for moti-
vating county prohibition but not for state-level prohibition. This is pre-
sumably because threat operates via contact, so neighboring states, gener-
ally less proximate than neighboring counties, were less salient. Reliance on
only a state-level model would have led us to believe there were only direct
effects of immigrant populations on legislation, but a county-level analysis
reveals a richer political process driven also by the demographic contexts of
neighboring units.
There are a number of limitations to our study. Analysis of organizations
is lacking; many key organizations influenced the unfolding of prohibition
legislation. Most important were the WCTU and the ASL. While the de-
mographic foundations of group threat are critical in and of themselves, it
remains an open question whether threat or key constituencies served to
mobilize organizations or whether they had an independent effect net of
their ability to organize formally. These organizational dynamics are im-
portant in their own right and merit further investigation. Finally, we have
left open questions about economic motivations for and against prohibition
such as tax revenue associated with alcohol sales and the market for beer,
wine, liquor, and the agricultural products used in alcohol production.
While there were many other important forces shaping prohibition, we
have shown that local prohibition policy was driven in large part by group
threat. We suspect that group threat has shaped and continues to shape
many other policy innovations. For example, the development of criminal
justice policies and restrictive residential policies appear to have been linked
to group threat ðJones-Correa 2000; Olzak and Shanahan 2014Þ. Historical
and contemporary conflict and policy change surrounding immigration may
be driven by spatial threat as well ðSteil and Vasi 2014Þ. The importance of
multiple scales of action and outcomes is likewise a pervasive feature of
politics from the local to the transnational arenas. Future work focusing on
group threat and policy change should build on the spatial conception of
threat advanced here to examine fundamental political processes of mobi-
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